Part One: Peace- The End of the Imam’s Responsibility or the Beginning of the Community’s Test?
Seyed Hashem Moosavi
Introduction
In analysing the peace treaty of Imam Hasan al-Mujtaba (peace be upon him), attention is usually directed entirely toward the Imam, and the questions often begin in this way: Why did Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) make peace? Why did he not continue the war? Why did he not rise up when Mu‘awiyah violated the treaty? Did he not know that Mu‘awiyah would not remain faithful to his pledge?
Important as these questions are, they do not contain the whole truth. They seem to assume from the outset that, in Islamic society, only the Imam bears responsibility while the people merely watch his decisions and actions. In this view, the Imam must gather the army, guide society, stand against the enemy, pay the price of struggle, and even compensate for the weakness, hesitation, worldliness, and covenant-breaking of the people. Yet far less is asked about the duty of the community.
From the perspective of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, however, social responsibility does not rest solely on the shoulders of the divine leader. The Imam shows the way, completes the proof, separates truth from falsehood, and makes decisions in accordance with the real capacities and interests of society. After that, the people too must prove their faith in the field of supporting truth, honouring covenants, resisting oppression, and standing by the rightful leader.
For this reason, the fundamental question about the peace of Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) may not be, “Why did the Imam make peace?” Rather, it should be asked: after the Imam concluded a clear treaty and Mu‘awiyah violated its terms one after another, what duty did the Islamic community have, and to what extent did it fulfil that duty?
This shift in perspective moves us from a purely historical discussion about the Imam’s decision into a broader field: the jurisprudence of the community’s responsibility. This jurisprudence concerns the duties of the people toward the true Imam, a deviant government, rulers who break covenants, political oppression, the distortion of religion, and threats to the public interests of Islamic society.
Before entering this issue, one fundamental doubt must be addressed: could the peace treaty of Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) have resulted from weakness, fear, compromise, or a lack of political insight on his part? If the answer is no, what truth do the Imam’s personality and the historical evidence reveal about the logic of that peace?
Did the Peace of Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) arise from weakness or naïveté?
In some superficial analyses, the peace of Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) is placed in opposition to the uprising of Imam Husayn (peace be upon him), with one portrayed as a symbol of compromise and the other as a symbol of resistance. This comparison is fundamentally mistaken. The two infallible Imams did not follow two contradictory paths; rather, in two different circumstances, they pursued one shared goal: preserving the truth of Islam and preventing deviation from fully occupying the place of religion.
To judge the peace of Imam Hasan (peace be upon him), one must first ask what kind of person made that decision. Was he inexperienced, isolated from politics, unfamiliar with the enemy, or reluctant to confront? Or was he a personality whose intellect, knowledge, courage, and defence of wilayah had been evident since childhood?
Embodied Intellect in the Household of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him and his family)
In a narration attributed to the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him and his family), it is said: «لَوْ كَانَ الْعَقْلُ رَجُلًا لَكَانَ الْحَسَنَ»; “If intellect were embodied as a man, it would be Hasan.” (Hamu’i Juwayni, Ibrahim ibn Muhammad, Fara’id al-Simtayn, vol. 2, p. 68)
This expression is not merely praise for the Imam’s ordinary intelligence. In Islamic thought, intellect is not simply the ability to calculate material profit and loss; it is the power to discern truth, recognize interests, foresee consequences, and choose the best path among difficult options. Political wisdom sometimes appears in attack and advance, and sometimes in stopping a war whose continuation would yield nothing but the destruction of the forces of truth and the strengthening of the enemy’s propaganda.
On this basis, if Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) is described as the embodiment of intellect, his peace cannot be understood as a passive act or a decision born of ignorance. The issue is not that the Imam was unaware of Mu‘awiyah’s nature; rather, he may well have known Mu‘awiyah, the army of Syria, the wavering elites of Iraq, and the real capacity of his own society better than anyone else.
Wisdom in Childhood
Ibn Shahr Ashub narrates that Imam Ali (peace be upon him), after hearing the words of Imam Hasan to Abu Sufyan when Hasan was no more than four years old, said: I praise Allah for placing within the Household of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him and his family), from the progeny of Muhammad al-Mustafa, someone like Yahya ibn Zakariyya, who was granted wisdom in childhood: «الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ الَّذِي جَعَلَ فِي آلِ مُحَمَّدٍ مِنْ ذُرِّيَّةِ مُحَمَّدٍ الْمُصْطَفَى نَظِيرَ يَحْيَى بْنِ زَكَرِيَّا ﴿وَآتَيْنَاهُ الْحُكْمَ صَبِيًّا﴾»; “Praise be to Allah who placed among the family of Muhammad, from the descendants of Muhammad al-Mustafa, one like Yahya ibn Zakariyya: ‘and We gave him wisdom while still a child.’” Ibn Shahr Ashub, Muhammad ibn Ali, Manaqib Al Abi Talib (peace be upon them), vol. 3, p. 173.
This narration shows that the understanding and insight of Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) did not suddenly appear during his caliphate. From the beginning, he was raised in the atmosphere of revelation, imamate, and Islamic politics. He witnessed the era of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him and his family), saw the events after his passing, experienced the years in which the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) was kept away from public authority, and during his father’s caliphate was present at the heart of the most important political and military crises of the Islamic community.
Therefore, peace with Mu‘awiyah was not the decision of someone encountering the complexities of power and politics for the first time.
Was Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) cautious or retreating in defence of wilayah?
It may be said that possessing intellect and wisdom does not necessarily mean courage in defending truth. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) defended wilayah and the sanctity of Islam in critical moments.
Defending the position of the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) in childhood
Al-Baladhuri, in Ansab al-Ashraf, narrates from Urwah that one day Abu Bakr was delivering a sermon from the pulpit. Imam Hasan (peace be upon him), who was then a young child, came forward and said: «اِنْزِلْ عَنْ مِنْبَرِ أَبِي»; “Come down from my father’s pulpit.”
When this act was attributed to Imam Ali (peace be upon him) as though he had instigated it, he said: «لَيْسَ هَذَا مِنْ مَلَإٍمِنَّا»; “This was not done at our instruction.” (Al-Baladhuri, Ahmad ibn Yahya, Ansab al-Ashraf, vol. 3, p. 26)
Regardless of the historical and theological discussions surrounding this report, what is clearly visible in it is Imam Hasan’s sensitivity to the position of wilayah and the inheritance of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him and his family). A child who, without being prompted or ordered by others, openly defends his father’s right would not, in adulthood, be indifferent to the usurpation of right and political deviation.
Direct confrontation with Mu‘awiyah and his agents
Even after the peace treaty, Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) never ceased speaking the truth. Peace did not mean accepting Mu‘awiyah’s religious legitimacy, remaining silent before distortions, or refraining from exposing the past of the Umayyads. His debates with Mu‘awiyah and figures such as Amr ibn al-As, Marwan ibn al-Hakam, Walid ibn Uqbah, Mughirah ibn Shu‘bah, and Utbah ibn Abi Sufyan show that the Imam defended the position of the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them) with complete clarity and reminded his opponents of their records.
In the reports of these arguments, the enemies tried, through coordinated and pre-planned statements, to put the Imam under pressure in Mu‘awiyah’s gathering. Yet he answered each of them appropriately and not only moved beyond a defensive posture but challenged their moral, religious, and historical legitimacy. (Al-Tabarsi, Fadl ibn Hasan, Al-Ihtijaj ala Ahl al-Lijaj, vol. 1, p. 288)
Therefore, the Imam’s peace cannot be regarded as silence before falsehood. He halted military war under specific circumstances, but he continued the doctrinal, cultural, and political struggle. Suspending one method of struggle did not mean abandoning resistance itself.
The Difference Between Compromise with Falsehood and Managing the Field of Struggle
In religious logic, courage does not always mean drawing the sword. Sometimes fighting when the army has collapsed from within and commanders have been bought is not courage; it is placing the lives of believers and the future of the movement of truth in danger of destruction.
Likewise, peace is not always a sign of fear. Accepting a treaty may become a means of preserving the forces of truth, exposing the enemy, and transferring the struggle from an unsuitable battlefield to a more effective arena.
Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) was neither afraid of Mu‘awiyah nor deluded about him. He distinguished between the “principle of resistance” and the “form of resistance.” The principle of confronting Umayyad deviation remained, but its form changed from a war lacking social support to a political and historical confrontation in which Mu‘awiyah was forced to accept clear commitments before the community and then, by violating those commitments, reveal his true nature.
Did Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) have sufficient political experience and standing?
Another doubt, sometimes unspoken beneath flawed analyses, is the assumption that Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) was mainly an ethical and devotional personality and lacked sufficient experience in managing political crises. An examination of his conduct during the government of the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) proves the opposite.
Clarifying the Issue of Arbitration
The arbitration affair was among the most complex crises of the caliphate of the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him). A group of the people of Kufa insisted, against the Imam’s view, on choosing Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari; then, when the harmful outcome of arbitration became clear, instead of accepting responsibility for their choice, they made the social atmosphere even more turbulent.
In such a situation, the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) asked Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) to speak about Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari and Amr ibn al-As and to clarify the truth of the matter for the people.
After praising and glorifying Allah, Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) said that these two men had been appointed to judge according to the Qur’an, not according to their desires. But when they placed desire before the Qur’an, they were no longer “judges”; rather, they themselves stood “judged” for error and deviation.
He then criticized Abu Musa’s mistake in proposing Abdullah ibn Umar for the caliphate from several angles: Umar ibn al-Khattab had not considered him suitable for the caliphate and had not included him in the council of six; Abdullah himself did not seek rule; and the Muhajirun and Ansar had not agreed upon his leadership.
Imam Hasan then, by referring to the judgment of Sa‘d ibn Mu‘adh in the case of Banu Qurayzah, separated the principle of arbitration and judgment from the abuse committed by Abu Musa and Amr ibn al-As. Thus, he neither hastily rejected the principle of arbitration nor justified the betrayal of the arbitrators; rather, with precision, he accepted the legitimacy of judgment in principle and exposed the deviation in its particular application and in the conduct of the arbitrators. (Qarashi, Baqir Sharif, Hayat al-Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him), vol. 1, p. 479)
These words are important in several respects:
First, Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) was able, in one of the most complicated political disputes, to distinguish between the legal principle of arbitration and the wrongful conduct of the arbitrators.
Second, he grounded his political reasoning in the Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him and his family), historical precedent, and the logic of public selection.
Third, in a crisis that required public clarification, the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) introduced his son to society as the one who would explain the government’s position.
Therefore, before his caliphate, Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) was not a marginal figure; he was one of the leading spokesmen and defenders of the Alid government.
Leading the Friday Prayer: A Sign of the Commander of the Faithful’s Scientific and Political Trust
In early Islamic society, Friday prayer was not merely an individual or ritual act of worship. The Friday sermon was the most important official platform of government for explaining religious, political, and social matters. Leading the Friday prayer- especially in the centre of the caliphate-required religious knowledge, political analytical ability, social influence, and public legitimacy.
In Mas‘udi’s report, whenever the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) was unable to lead the Friday prayer in Kufa because of illness or another excuse, he appointed Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) to that responsibility. (Al-Mas‘udi, Ali ibn Husayn, Muruj al-Dhahab, vol. 1, p. 345)
This choice shows that, in the view of the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him), Imam Hasan possessed the competence to represent the government scientifically and politically. A person who delivered the Friday sermon in the capital of the Alid government was neither unknown to society nor distant from the complexities of public administration.
In one sermon attributed to him, he said: “Allah did not send any prophet except that He appointed after him a successor, a family, or a group. By the One who chose Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him and his family) as a prophet, no one falls short regarding us, the Ahl al-Bayt, except that Allah will diminish his deed; and no state rises against us except that its end will belong to us.”
This statement shows that Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) had already understood the community’s political conflict not merely as rivalry between individuals, but within the framework of imamate, succession to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him and his family), and the responsibility of the community toward the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them).
After the martyrdom of the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him), those who pledged allegiance to Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) were not facing an unknown personality. They had seen his knowledge, eloquence, political management, military presence, and explicit defence of the Alid government. Therefore, the weakness of society in supporting the Imam cannot be attributed to complete ignorance of his rank.
If the Imam knew Mu‘awiyah, why did he make a treaty with him?
Now a more important question arises: if Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) possessed such intellect, knowledge, experience, and insight- and if he also knew Mu‘awiyah’s nature- why did he make a treaty with someone whose breach of promise was highly likely?
To answer this, we must first examine the Qur’an’s view of making covenants with an enemy.
The Qur’an and the Principle of Honouring Covenants
The Noble Qur’an presents fulfilment of covenants as one of the most important signs of faith: «يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَوْفُوا بِالْعُقُودِ»; “O you who believe, fulfil your contracts.” (Al-Ma’idah 5:1)
It also says: «وَأَوْفُوا بِالْعَهْدِ إِنَّ الْعَهْدَ كَانَ مَسْئُولًا»; “And fulfil the covenant, for the covenant will surely be questioned about.” (Al-Isra’ 17:34)
These commands do not concern only covenants among believers. In verses dealing with the polytheists too, the Qur’an obliges Muslims, so long as the other party remains faithful to its covenant, to remain faithful as well: «إِلَّا الَّذِينَ عَاهَدْتُمْ مِنَ الْمُشْرِكِينَ ثُمَّ لَمْ يَنْقُصُوكُمْ شَيْئًا وَلَمْ يُظَاهِرُوا عَلَيْكُمْ أَحَدًا فَأَتِمُّوا إِلَيْهِمْ عَهْدَهُمْ إِلَى مُدَّتِهِمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُتَّقِينَ»; “Except those among the polytheists with whom you made a treaty and who have not failed you in anything nor supported anyone against you; so fulfil their treaty with them until the end of its term. Indeed, Allah loves the God-conscious.” (Al-Tawbah 9:4)
This verse counts fulfilment of a covenant, even toward polytheists, as part of taqwa. Therefore, awareness of the enemy’s possible betrayal does not by itself make the conclusion of a treaty illegitimate or useless.
The Noble Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him and his family) also concluded treaties with polytheist and Jewish groups, even though he was aware of their enmity, rivalry, and possible breach of covenant. The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah is one of the clearest examples. A treaty may be necessary to stop bloodshed, preserve the Islamic community, expose the aggressor, create an opportunity for preaching, or define the obligations of the parties.
The Qur’an’s Warning Against Naïveté in Treaties
Alongside the command to honour covenants, the Qur’an repeatedly warns Muslims against naïve optimism toward treacherous enemies. Regarding a group of polytheists, it says: «كَيْفَ وَإِنْ يَظْهَرُوا عَلَيْكُمْ لَا يَرْقُبُوا فِيكُمْ إِلًّا وَلَا ذِمَّةً»; “How could there be a treaty, when if they gain dominance over you, they observe neither kinship nor covenant concerning you?” (Al-Tawbah 9:8)
Then it says: «لَا يَرْقُبُونَ فِي مُؤْمِنٍ إِلًّا وَلَا ذِمَّةً وَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْمُعْتَدُونَ»; “They observe neither kinship nor covenant regarding any believer; and it is they who are the transgressors.” (Al-Tawbah 9:10)
And in the event of breaking the covenant and attacking religion, it commands confrontation: «وَإِنْ نَكَثُوا أَيْمَانَهُمْ مِنْ بَعْدِ عَهْدِهِمْ وَطَعَنُوا فِي دِينِكُمْ فَقَاتِلُوا أَئِمَّةَ الْكُفْرِ إِنَّهُمْ لَا أَيْمَانَ لَهُمْ لَعَلَّهُمْ يَنْتَهُونَ»; “And if they break their oaths after their treaty and attack your religion, then fight the leaders of disbelief; indeed, they have no binding oaths, so that they may desist.” (Al-Tawbah 9:12)
The phrase «لَا أَيْمَانَ لَهُمْ» does not mean that Muslims should never make treaties with such enemies. Rather, it warns that the security and future of the Islamic community must not be built, without readiness and vigilance, upon their verbal commitments.
From these verses, three principles can be extracted:
- Muslims may conclude a treaty with an enemy if that treaty accords with the legitimate interests of the Islamic community.
- So long as the other party remains faithful to its covenant, Muslims too must remain faithful to it.
- The Islamic community must not be heedless of the possibility of betrayal and, in the case of a clear breach of covenant, must respond legitimately and proportionately to the circumstances.
Thus, the logic of the Qur’an is not: “Because the enemy may betray, never make a treaty with him.” Rather, it says: make treaties, remain faithful to your treaty, but do not be naïve and do not remain indifferent in the face of covenant breaking.
The peace of Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) must be understood within this framework.
Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) did not make peace with Mu‘awiyah out of moral or personal trust. He knew well that Mu‘awiyah’s primary goal was power and that he used threat, bribery, rumour-making, and the purchase of commanders to reach it.
In the sources concerning the peace treaty, conditions are mentioned according to which Mu‘awiyah was to act in accordance with the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him and his family), guarantee the security of the Shi‘ah and supporters of the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him), refrain from harming Imam Hasan and Imam Husayn (peace be upon them), and not appoint a successor for himself. Although there are differences in the reports regarding the details of the treaty, protecting the followers of the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) and limiting Mu‘awiyah’s power are common elements in the reports.
These conditions show that peace did not mean handing the community over to Mu‘awiyah without conditions. By drawing up the treaty, the Imam placed Mu‘awiyah’s future conduct before clear standards:
- Would he remain committed to the Qur’an and the Sunnah?
- Would he respect the security of his political opponents?
- Would he turn government into his personal property?
- Would he transform the caliphate into hereditary monarchy?
- Would he refrain from harming the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them)?
In this way, the peace treaty became a political and moral test. Mu‘awiyah could no longer hide his conduct within an ambiguous atmosphere of propaganda. Every breach of covenant became a clear witness to the distance between his government and Islamic principles.
The Imam’s peace was not trust in Mu‘awiyah; it was compelling Mu‘awiyah to reveal his truth before the community.
Why did the Imam not continue the war at that time?
A complete answer to this question requires examining the condition of the Iraqi army, its commanders, tribes, and the social atmosphere after the battles of Jamal, Siffin, and Nahrawan. In summary, however, Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) faced a society in which a significant part had lost the ability and will to pay the price of resistance.
Different groups were present among the Imam’s forces: loyal Shi‘ah, Kharijites, the hesitant, the worldly, followers of tribal chiefs, and those who sought booty or personal security more than the defence of truth. Mu‘awiyah, knowing these divisions, targeted commanders and influential figures with promises of money and position.
Historical reports speak of confusion in the army, rumours of commanders being killed, correspondence by some tribal leaders with Mu‘awiyah, an attack on the Imam’s tent, and even the Imam being wounded. In such an atmosphere, continuing the war could have led not to Mu‘awiyah’s defeat, but to the Imam’s capture or martyrdom at the hands of forces outwardly on his own side, and to the destruction of the remaining front of truth.
In some reports, Ubaydullah ibn Abbas, commander of part of the army, abandoned the Imam’s front after receiving Mu‘awiyah’s financial promise- an event that reveals the depth of infiltration and internal collapse within the army.
In this situation, the Imam was not choosing between two ideal and desirable options; he faced two difficult paths:
- Continuing the war with an unstable army whose chance of victory was very small and whose chance of destroying the forces of truth was very high;
- Or accepting a conditional treaty that would preserve the blood of believers, not recognize Mu‘awiyah’s religious legitimacy, make his obligations public, and prepare the ground for the community’s historical judgment.
Choosing the second option was not fleeing responsibility; it was accepting responsibility in its most difficult form. Sometimes a leader sacrifices his immediate popularity for the survival of truth. Fighting might have created a more heroic appearance for the Imam, but the Imam was not seeking to build a heroic image of himself; he sought to preserve religion and the community of believers.
Peace did not end the Imam’s responsibility; it revealed the field of the community’s responsibility
After the treaty was concluded, Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) did not abandon his duties. He did not cease speaking the truth, criticizing Umayyad rule, defending the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them), training faithful forces, or preserving the doctrinal boundaries of society. Peace changed only the form of confrontation.
At the same time, however, a new situation emerged. Mu‘awiyah had accepted commitments before the Islamic community, and the people had witnessed those commitments. From then on, whenever Mu‘awiyah departed from the Book and the Sunnah, placed pressure on the Shi‘ah, insulted the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him), or prepared the ground for Yazid’s succession, he was not merely violating his treaty with Imam Hasan (peace be upon him); he was breaking the sanctity of a public commitment before the Islamic community.
Here, responsibility was not directed only toward the Imam. The Islamic community also had a duty to:
- recognise the breach of covenant;
- refuse to accept the government’s propaganda;
- support the oppressed;
- not remain silent in the face of the transformation of the caliphate into monarchy;
- not leave the rightful Imam alone;
- and, to the extent of its ability, prevent the consolidation of oppression and the distortion of religion.
But did the people do this?
Did the leading figures of society explain Mu‘awiyah’s breach of covenant to the people?
Did the scholars, reciters of the Qur’an, tribal chiefs, and influential figures stand against the pressure placed upon the Shi‘ah?
Did the people who had previously called the Imam to war and then left him alone accept their responsibility this time?
These questions bring us to the heart of the matter. The analysis of Imam Hasan’s peace treaty (peace be upon him) becomes complete only when the conduct of the community is assessed alongside the conduct of the Imam. Perhaps a large part of what has been known as “the consequence of the Imam’s peace” was, in truth, the consequence of the shortcomings of a people who neither offered worthy support during the war nor fulfilled their social responsibility after the treaty had been violated.
In the second part, drawing on the verses of the Qur’an and the teachings of Islamic political jurisprudence, the responsibility of the different groups within society- from scholars and elites to tribal leaders and the general public- will be examined. We will also see whether silence in the face of covenant-breaking, the killing of Shi‘ah, the cursing of the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him), and the preparation of the ground for Yazid’s succession was merely a political weakness, or whether it amounted to abandoning a religious and social duty.
