Part Two: After the Treaty Was Violated, What Duty Did the Ummah Have?
Seyed Hashem Moosavi
Introduction: Returning the People to the Heart of the Event
In the first issue, it became clear that the peace treaty of Imam Hasan al-Mujtaba (peace be upon him) did not arise from weakness, fear, or naïve optimism toward Mu‘awiya. Rather, it was the result of the Imam’s realistic assessment of both the enemy and his own society. The Iraqi army had been weakened from within; some tribal leaders had been drawn away by Mu‘awiya’s inducements; and continuing the war carried, more than any hope of victory, the danger of destroying the loyal forces and even of the Imam’s martyrdom at the hands of that same unstable society.
Yet the peace treaty did not bring responsibilities to an end; it transformed the mode of struggle. From that point onward, Mu‘awiya stood under clear obligations before the Muslim Ummah, and his conduct had to be assessed against the terms of the treaty, the Book of God, the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him and his family), and the public rights of Muslims.
The central question is this: after the treaty was violated, was Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) alone responsible for taking action, or did the community also have a duty in the face of treaty-breaking, oppression, distortion of religion, and the transformation of the nature of government?
The answer of the Qur’an and the Sunnah is clear: the Imam is not the only one charged with responsibility in society. The Ummah, too, is responsible-each person and group according to their knowledge, power, influence, and means-to support truth and prevent falsehood from becoming established.
Breach of Covenant: A Personal Matter Between the Imam and Mu‘awiya, or an Assault on the Rights of the Community?
The peace treaty was not a private arrangement between the Imam and Mu‘awiya. Its subject was governance, public security, the lives of the Shi‘a, the future of the caliphate, and the prevention of Muslim bloodshed. Accordingly, violating the treaty was not merely an infringement upon the Imam’s right; it was also a violation of the public rights of the Muslim Ummah.
The Noble Qur’an says concerning fulfilment of covenants: «وَأَوْفُوا بِالْعَهْدِ إِنَّ الْعَهْدَ كَانَ مَسْئُولًا» “Fulfil the covenant, for the covenant will surely be subject to questioning.” (al-Isra’ 17:34). Thus, the Qur’an presents fidelity to covenants as a religious responsibility. Consequently, people who benefit from the effects of a covenant and have the ability to defend it cannot remain indifferent when violation of that covenant becomes a permanent practice.
What Is the Qur’anic Ruling When There Is Fear of Treachery or Open Violation of a Treaty?
The Noble Qur’an, on the one hand, commands Muslims to honour their covenants, while on the other hand, it warns them against naïve optimism toward those who break their treaties. These two sets of verses establish a balanced and realistic policy: neither pre-emptive treachery is permitted, nor naïveté and passivity in the face of the enemy’s betrayal.
In verse 57 of Surah al-Anfal, the Qur’an states: «وَإِمَّا تَخَافَنَّ مِنْ قَوْمٍ خِيَانَةً فَانْبِذْ إِلَيْهِمْ عَلَى سَوَاءٍ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُحِبُّ الْخَائِنِينَ» “And if you fear treachery from a people, then renounce the treaty with them on equal terms; indeed, Allah does not love the treacherous.” Concerning open violation of a covenant, Surah al-Tawbah likewise says: «وَإِنْ نَكَثُوا أَيْمَانَهُمْ مِنْ بَعْدِ عَهْدِهِمْ وَطَعَنُوا فِي دِينِكُمْ فَقَاتِلُوا أَئِمَّةَ الْكُفْرِ إِنَّهُمْ لَا أَيْمَانَ لَهُمْ لَعَلَّهُمْ يَنْتَهُونَ» “And if they break their oaths after their covenant and attack your religion, then confront the leaders of disbelief; indeed, they have no binding oaths, so that they may desist.” (al-Tawbah 9:12).
On the basis of these verses, the Islamic Ummah is neither permitted to answer a treaty-breaker with reciprocal treachery, nor entitled to ignore an open act of betrayal. The form of response depends on circumstances, capacity, public interest, and the judgment of legitimate leadership; however, the basic principle of refusing indifference toward breach of covenant and attacks on religion is undeniable.
Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) avoided treachery and premature action; yet a large part of the Ummah fell into negligence and failed to discharge its social responsibilities in the face of the treaty’s violation.
Did Mu‘awiya’s Breach of Covenant Automatically Terminate the Treaty?
At this point, several issues must be distinguished: first, the collapse of Mu‘awiya’s moral and political credibility; second, the right to confront his violations; and third, the possibility and public interest of initiating a new war.
Every breach of covenant weakens the moral legitimacy of the violator and creates for the other party the right to protest and respond proportionately. Yet this does not mean that the Imam, without considering the community’s capacity, the outcome of war, and the interests of Muslims, was obliged immediately to return to military conflict.
In political jurisprudence, a distinction must be made between the establishment of a duty and the possibility of carrying out one particular form of that duty. Opposing wrongdoing may be obligatory, yet the mode of opposition varies according to power, likelihood of effectiveness, and consequences. At times the duty is military confrontation; at other times public protest, exposure and clarification, support for the oppressed, refusal to cooperate with the government, or preservation of forces for a more suitable stage.
After the peace treaty, Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) did not remain silent in a manner that implied approval of Mu‘awiya’s deviation. In his debates and statements, he challenged the moral legitimacy of the Umayyads and defended the right of the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them). What he did not do was initiate a new war with a society that had already demonstrated its unwillingness to support the Imam steadfastly.
In reality, Mu‘awiya’s breach of covenant could have become the source of a renewed duty for the Ummah. But the Ummah could not transfer all of its responsibility to the Imam and then ask him to begin a new war with the very people who had abandoned him in the previous stage.
A divinely guided leader is not obliged to believe on behalf of the people, to show loyalty in their place, or, in the absence of the minimum social conditions, to personally bear the cost of all their failures.
The First Responsibility of the Ummah: Recognising the Breach of Covenant and Not Being Deceived by Propaganda
The first duty of the people after the treaty was violated was to understand reality correctly, because no social action can take shape without insight. The Umayyad government tried to justify its violations with terms such as preserving security, preventing sedition, and protecting unity.
For this reason, the Qur’an warns Muslims against accepting reports without investigation: «يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِنْ جَاءَكُمْ فَاسِقٌ بِنَبَإٍ فَتَبَيَّنُوا أَنْ تُصِيبُوا قَوْمًا بِجَهَالَةٍ فَتُصْبِحُوا عَلَى مَا فَعَلْتُمْ نَادِمِينَ» “O you who believe, if a transgressor brings you news, verify it, lest you harm a people out of ignorance and then become regretful for what you have done.” (al-Hujurat 49:6).
The Ummah’s duty was to assess Mu‘awiya’s conduct not through official propaganda, but through the terms of the treaty and the standards of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. The persecution of the Shi‘a, the demand for allegiance to Yazid, and the killing of objectors were each clear signs of the treaty’s violation and of a transformation in the nature of government.
Thus, the Ummah’s first failure occurred before the field of action: it occurred in the field of understanding and explanation. A people who accepted the language of government in place of the standards of religion gradually lost the ability to recognise breach of covenant.
The Second Responsibility: Refusing to Cooperate in Sin and Aggression
After recognising deviation, the second stage is to refrain from cooperating with it. The Noble Qur’an says: «وَتَعَاوَنُوا عَلَى الْبِرِّ وَالتَّقْوَى وَلَا تَعَاوَنُوا عَلَى الْإِثْمِ وَالْعُدْوَانِ» “Cooperate with one another in righteousness and piety, and do not cooperate in sin and aggression.” (al-Ma’idah 5:2).
This verse extends social responsibility beyond the direct commission of injustice. False reports, unlawful testimony, religious justification, financial support, or accepting a position that serves oppression can all become instances of assisting sin and aggression.
Mu‘awiya’s government could not have implemented its policies without a network of governors, judges, preachers, poets, tribal chiefs, and military forces. The jurisprudence of the Ummah’s responsibility therefore asks who made the machinery of oppression possible.
The minimum duty of society was to avoid participation in repression and distortion: not to repeat the government’s lies, not to testify against the innocent, and not to construct religious legitimacy for Mu‘awiya’s policies.
The Third Responsibility: Not Inclining Toward or Relying on the Oppressors
The Wise Qur’an warns: «وَلَا تَرْكَنُوا إِلَى الَّذِينَ ظَلَمُوا فَتَمَسَّكُمُ النَّارُ» “Do not incline toward those who have done wrong, lest the Fire touch you.” (Hud 11:113).
Inclination is not limited to formally joining the oppressor; it also includes trust, attraction, and practical reliance upon him. Many people may dislike oppression yet rely on an oppressive system in order to preserve their position, security, or interests.
Part of the durability of Mu‘awiya’s rule resulted from this social inclination: influential figures who saw the deviation but, under slogans such as preserving calm and avoiding sedition, helped sustain the existing order.
The Fourth Responsibility: Enjoining Right and Forbidding Wrong
One of the most important foundations of the jurisprudence of the Ummah’s responsibility is the principle of enjoining right and forbidding wrong. The Noble Qur’an says: «وَلْتَكُنْ مِنْكُمْ أُمَّةٌ يَدْعُونَ إِلَى الْخَيْرِ وَيَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ وَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْمُفْلِحُونَ» “Let there be among you a group who call to goodness, enjoin what is right, and forbid what is wrong; they are the successful.” (Al ‘Imran 3:104).
It also says about the believers: «وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ وَالْمُؤْمِنَاتُ بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْلِيَاءُ بَعْضٍ يَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ» “The believing men and believing women are allies of one another; they enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong.” (al-Tawbah 9:71).
These verses show that enjoining right and forbidding wrong is a public duty, although its levels and methods depend on knowledge, ability, likelihood of effect, and avoiding a greater harm.
After the treaty was violated, the instances of wrongdoing were clear: persecution of the Shi‘a, undermining the status of the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him), misuse of the public treasury, buying off tribal leaders, and paving the way for Yazid’s succession.
The community had a duty to recognize these matters as wrong and not allow repetition and propaganda to turn them into something normal.
The Fifth Responsibility: Defending the Oppressed
Confronting a deviant government was not limited to defending a political theory. Real human beings were being subjected to pressure, imprisonment, exile, and killing. The Qur’an calls believers to stand for justice: «يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا كُونُوا قَوَّامِينَ بِالْقِسْطِ شُهَدَاءَ لِلَّهِ وَلَوْ عَلَى أَنْفُسِكُمْ أَوِ الْوَالِدَيْنِ وَالْأَقْرَبِينَ» “O you who believe, stand firmly for justice, as witnesses for Allah, even if against yourselves, parents, or relatives.” (al-Nisa’ 4:135).
Standing for justice is not only the ruler’s duty; the verse addresses all believers. Society must, to the extent of its ability, support the oppressed, speak the truth, and not allow the victims of government to be portrayed as criminals in official propaganda.
In the case of Hujr ibn ‘Adi, even if not everyone had the ability to prevent the injustice directly, scholars, tribes, and the people could have testified to the truth, refused to hand believers over to the machinery of repression, and not left the families of the victims alone.
The Sixth Responsibility: Supporting the Rightful Imam
In Shi‘i thought, recognizing the Imam is not complete without supporting him. Walayah is not merely heartfelt affection or theoretical belief; in times of need, it leads to support, obedience, and bearing costs.
After the peace treaty, support for the Imam could have appeared in maintaining intellectual and spiritual connection with him, transmitting his positions, supporting his followers under pressure, refusing to accept Umayyad propaganda, and refraining from cooperation with anti-Alid policies.
Expecting the Imam to stand alone against Mu‘awiya’s extensive government while the people paid no price was incompatible with the logic of Imamate. The Imam is the guide of the Ummah, not a substitute for its will and action.
The Special Responsibility of Society’s Influential Figures
All members of society are responsible, but responsibilities are not equal. Scholars, reciters, preachers, and influential figures had a heavier duty because of their effect on public opinion; their words or silence could change the direction of society and might even be understood as approval of the government.
The main duty of such figures was to preserve religious standards and prevent the distortion of public understanding.
They had to make clear that obedience to a ruler is not absolute, and that no slogan-such as unity, security, or avoiding sedition-can justify violating the Book of God, the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him and his family), and the rights of the people.
They also had to keep alive the terms of the peace treaty and the instances of its violation, so that the government could not rewrite history or present its breach of covenant as a public interest.
In the face of repression against the Shi‘a and the Companions of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him and his family), influential figures had a duty to testify to the truth, defend the victims, and not allow the government’s propaganda apparatus to erase them from the religious memory of society.
Most importantly, they should not have granted legitimacy to the project of Yazid’s succession, for that step transformed Islamic government from responsible caliphate into hereditary monarchy.
The silence of influential figures is not always neutrality. Sometimes society concludes from their silence that no deviation has occurred, and that very silence unintentionally becomes a tool for granting legitimacy.
Of course, real incapacity must be distinguished from concealing the truth in order to preserve status, wealth, or security. Fear may be understandable, but turning fear into a permanent theory for justifying oppression is abandonment of religious responsibility.
The Responsibility of Officials and Government Forces
Government officials could not hide their moral responsibility behind the command of a superior and say that they were merely carrying out orders.
In Islamic logic, obedience to a created being in disobedience to the Creator is not acceptable. No administrative order can make oppression, false testimony, killing the innocent, or violating people’s rights lawful.
Governors, judges, officers, preachers, and false witnesses were each responsible according to their role in the machinery of oppression. Transferring blame to the ruler above them did not remove their individual responsibility.
Governmental oppression is usually the result of a chain of decision, justification, ruling, execution, propaganda, and silence. If each link refuses to accompany oppression, the cost of repression rises.
Therefore, the continuation of an oppressive government does not depend only on the ruler’s command; it also depends on those who, by denying personal responsibility, imagine themselves to be powerless tools of authority.
The Responsibility of the General Public: Does Incapacity Remove All Duties?
The capacity of ordinary people was not the same as that of scholars, commanders, and tribal leaders, and the Shari‘ah does not impose a duty beyond one’s ability: «لَا يُكَلِّفُ اللَّهُ نَفْسًا إِلَّا وُسْعَهَا» “Allah does not burden any soul except according to its capacity.” (al-Baqarah 2:286).
Yet limited power does not remove all duties. Each person could, within their ability, preserve the truth in their family and environment, refuse to repeat the government’s lies, refrain from insulting the oppressed, avoid informing and false testimony, show sympathy to the families of prisoners and martyrs, and keep love for the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them) alive in the next generation.
Inner rejection is the lowest level of confronting wrongdoing, not a substitute for all other levels. A person who has the ability to speak or act cannot be content with inner dissatisfaction alone; but one who is truly incapable must at least not approve of oppression or participate in it.
The problem with part of the society of Mu‘awiya’s age was not mere incapacity; it was becoming accustomed to the existing order and preferring personal security and benefit over religious responsibility.
It is here that comfort-seeking turns from human weakness into abandonment of religious duty.
Did the People Fulfil Their Duties?
The answer cannot be given in a single, absolute way. Not all people remained silent. Figures such as Hujr ibn ‘Adi, ‘Amr ibn Hamiq, and a group of Shi‘a stood firm in their positions and accepted the cost of life, imprisonment, exile, and displacement. Preserving love for and following the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them) in that difficult atmosphere was a sign of resistance by part of the community.
At the general level, however, society’s response was not proportionate to the scale of deviation. Violations of the treaty continued without broad resistance, protesting Shi‘a were often left alone, the project of Yazid’s succession was realized, and concepts such as unity, avoiding sedition, and obedience to the ruler were used to silence protest against oppression.
Therefore, the Ummah was not wholly unaware of its responsibility, yet in the aggregate it did not fulfil its historical duty. A minority resisted, while the majority became trapped between fear, calculations of expediency, worldliness, confusion, and comfort-seeking.
Why Did Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) Not Rise in Place of the People?
Even after accepting the community’s responsibility, one may still ask: if the people failed, could the Imam not have risen with his small group of loyal followers and compensated for that failure?
This question requires reflection from two angles.
First, the Imam is not obliged, whenever the people abandon their duty, to place his own life and the lives of the few believers in a fruitless operation without regard to the outcome. Martyrdom in Islam is not an independent goal; it gains strategic value when it serves the preservation of religion, the completion of proof, and the awakening of society.
The conditions of Mu‘awiya’s era were not the same as those of Yazid’s era. Mu‘awiya possessed political experience, a religious appearance, a broad propaganda network, and the ability to manage public opinion. He could have portrayed a limited movement by the Imam as a breach of treaty, rebellion against Muslim unity, or a return to civil war.
Second, an uprising by the Imam without minimum social preparedness would have repeated the very problem that had led to the peace treaty. People who had previously broken their pledges and abandoned the army had not become a loyal force merely because Mu‘awiya violated the treaty.
The Imam had to consider not only the rightness of an uprising, but also the real capacity to achieve its goals. The rationality of Imamate required distinguishing between protest and war, between exposure and military action, and between preserving proof and destroying forces.
Therefore, Imam Hasan’s lack of military uprising after Mu‘awiya’s violations did not signify acceptance of those violations. Rather, it signified that society had not yet provided the necessary conditions for transforming rightful protest into an effective military movement.
The Failure of the Peace Treaty, or the Failure of the Community?
From what has been discussed, it can be concluded that the violation of the treaty did not mean the failure of Imam Hasan’s strategy. If the Imam’s goal had been to turn Mu‘awiya into a faithful and loyal person, one could say the peace treaty failed; but no such goal existed.
The peace treaty had several functions:
- It prevented the immediate destruction of the front of the faithful;
- It exposed the nature of the army and society of Iraq;
- It imposed clear obligations on Mu‘awiya;
- It made his future conduct measurable;
- It removed the accusation of warmongering from the hands of Umayyad propaganda;
- And it revealed the responsibility of the community in the face of breach of covenant.
By violating the treaty, Mu‘awiya exposed himself more than he defeated the peace treaty. He showed that a contract had no intrinsic value for him and was respected only as long as it served the acquisition and consolidation of power.
What failed was society’s readiness to benefit from this exposure. The Ummah was unable to transform the revealed face of the government into a proportionate movement. Many people saw the truth but did not translate it into decision and action.
Thus, a distinction must be made between two things: the treaty was violated at the level of implementation, but at the level of establishing proof and exposing the nature of the government, it achieved its purpose.
The real failure occurred when a large part of the community, after the proof had been completed, failed to fulfill its responsibility.
Conclusion
The jurisprudence of the Ummah’s responsibility shows that after the peace treaty of Imam Hasan (peace be upon him), the responsibility of society and its elites—such as scholars and tribal leaders—was extremely serious in the face of Mu‘awiya’s breach of covenant, the struggle against oppression, and the prevention of hereditary rule.
Despite the resistance of people such as Hujr ibn ‘Adi, the majority of society did not fulfill its duties because it was not prepared to pay the required cost.
Therefore, the peace treaty of Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) should not be regarded as the Imam’s failure. The Imam made his decision according to the real capacities of society, preserved the blood of the believers, placed clear conditions before Mu‘awiya, and completed the proof against the Ummah. The real failure was the failure of a society in which many recognised the truth but were not prepared to pay the price of defending it.
